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1 
TRANSPARENCY ISSUE IN THE AMEDMENT OF ICSID ARBITRAITON RULES 
- PUBLIC RIGHT TO INFORMATION VS PUBLIC CONFIDENCE?
HONG-LIN YU 
Abstract: The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 
began its fourth-time Arbitration Rules amendment process1 on 7 October 2016. One 
of the issues currently being looked into is the scope of transparency and its expansion 
in the upcoming amendment. The public consultation for the process reveals that 
consultees are keen to see a greater level of transparency be brought into this arbitration 
dispute mechanism. In particular, the dispute process can involve host states, investors, 
home states and the public. Many speculations were expressed on this issue. However, 
not until April 2018, one gets a glimpse of how the working paper group may address 
the issue of transparency at the Charles N.Brower Lecture on International Dispute 
Resolution on 5 April 2018 given by, and at a later interview2 with Ms. Meg Kinnear, 
the Secretary General of ICSID. The speech indicates that the consideration on the issue 
of transparency is “public confidence”. This is different from the ethos of “the public’s 
right to know” instilled in the Transparency Rules. This article analyses the 
transparency issue from the language used in the interview to formulate a view on how 
this issue would be and could be treated in the amendment. 
*Dr. Hong-Lin Yu, Reader in Law, Stirling Law School, University of Stirling, UK.
1 2017 The ICSID Rules Amendment Process, at 1.
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/about/ICSID%20Rules%20Amendment%20Process-ENG.pdf
<accessed on 23 June 2018>
2 Crina Baltag (Acting Editor) , Interview with Meg Kinnear, Secretary General of the International Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 15 April, 2018
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On 5 April 2018, the ICSID Secretary-General, Ms. Meg Kinnear, delivered a speech at the 
Charles N. Brower Lecture on International Dispute Resolution.3 The speech provides the 
clearest indication so far the direction the ICSID amendment may take for its investment 
Arbitration Rules. It is said that the purpose of the amendment is to provide a tangible system 
for resolution of investment disputes. The amendment is aimed to be a practical and positive 
change to deliver a modern and efficient system using simplified language for easy 
understanding of the rules. With a broad consultation conducted, there may be hope for 
consistent consensus building. Her speech also provides an insight into how working paper 
may address transparency issues raised at the consultation stage.  In her speech, Ms. Kinnear 
firstly highlighted several areas which are currently considered in the working paper. These 
include: public access to hearings, public access to case documents, participation of non-
disputing party, mandatory publication of awards and an early dismissal for lack legal merits. 
She also stressed that in order to deliver a smooth amendment at the ICSID Annual Conference 
in October 2019, the importance of ensuring a high level of consensus among 66% of 153 
ICSID Member States is paramount. The consensus can only be achieved by maintaining the 
balance between the interests of investor and host state through a pragmatic approach of 
improvement of dispute settlement. Among others, the most important message arising from 
the speech reflecting the scale of amendment is that there will not no radical changes. Instead 
there should be an incremental reform accompanied by a pragmatic and an efficient approach. 
Hopefully, this will ensure an approval required for the amendment. This is because, in her 
own words, most States require clarity and certainty about the direction the amendment will 
take. Particularly, many rules in the current version already provides a basis for a systematic 
                                                 
3 Ms. Meg Kinnear, 2018 Charles N. Brower Lecture on International Dispute Resolution, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xDUtMVejidI&feature=youtu.be&list=PLTPAfLBOjfQLSs3s8Nx5Jj94Guj
3goxCs <accessed on 23 June 2018> 
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reform which delivers the capacity to allow States and investors to move with the direction led 
by ICSID.  
 
 
In her speech, she spoke about the ground rules followed in the Working Paper. They are: 
Commitment to keep balance between investors and Member States, avoiding over regulation, 
and using plain and gender-neutral language in its drafting style. Due to the difficulties 
associated with amendment to a Convention, the working paper will not seek amendment to 
the ICSID Convention.4 Instead, the working paper will only suggest amendment to the ICSID 
Arbitration Rules. To resist the temptation to over-regulate, the amendment will be aided by 
guidance papers, sample precedent, and soft law. It is also pointed out that the working paper 
group would welcome interaction between the ICSID amended Arbitration Rules and modern 
BITs to allow states space to adopt newer procedural rules. The working paper is also said to 
contain an awareness of an overlap between the amended Rules and other conventions, such as 
the Mauritius Convention. However, it was pointed out that the so-called opt in / opt out 
technique in the Mauritius Convention will not be incorporated in the ICSID amendment. 
 
Besides transitional provision and others,5 the Secretary-General pointed out that the most 
delicate issue which requires to be considered carefully is the issue of transparency. In her view, 
this issue is further linked to the amendment in relation to allocation of costs and tribunal’s 
                                                 
4 Although Convention amendment is not sought, Ms. Meg Kinnear indicated that future convention changes 
will be flagged up, such as the enlargement of the panel of arbitrators and conciliators. 
5 The possible amendment includes: simple worded rules, requirement of more factual and appointment details 
from claimant when a request for arbitration is made, designated request for arbitration at the first memorial, 
duty to proceed in an efficient manner, 100% electronic filing, tribunal’s duty of disclosure and disqualification 
and transparency. The areas of appeal facilities and tribunal, mandatory list of arbitrator’s appointments will not 
be addressed but the double hatting and third party funding are hoping to be indirectly regulated through the 
duty of an early disclosure and avoidance of conflict of interest. 
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duty of disclosure and disqualification. This may include an elaborated tribunal’s duty of 
disclosure and declaration in relation to its relationship to the parties, to the counsels, to co-
arbitrator and to funders. However, the method was not specified during the speech, though her 
mention of soft law may provide some indication. She made it clear that Mauritius Convention 
and the Transparency Rules (The UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based 
Investor-State Arbitration, hereinafter Transparency Rules)6 is only to supplement the ICSID 
Rules on transparency. She indicates that mandatory publication of award, orders and decisions 
will be included to promote consistency and coherence in the decision-making, whereas, other 
documents will still be subject to the treaty obligations and parties’ consent.  
 
This article intends to analyse the transparency issue from the language used in the interview 
to formulate a view how this issue would be and could be treated in its amendment. To that 
end, this paper will proceed as follows. In the first part, the author will contextualise the issue 
of transparency by reference to the current ICSID Arbitration Rules. The author will summarise 
the differences and issues related to access to hearing and documentation, amicus curiae briefs, 
and publication of awards. From this perspective, the issues will be examined against the 
speech made by the Secretary – General of ICSID to illustrate how the issue of transparency 
may currently be viewed in the working paper. The examination will be followed by an 
assessment of the link between transparency and “public confidence” mentioned in the speech 
and the interview on the ICSID amendment. The assessment will query who the public may be 
in the eye of the working paper group. From the assessment of “the public”, the paper will 
                                                 
6 https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Amendment-of-ICSID-Rules-and-Regulations.aspx <accessed on 
23 June 2018> 
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argue that the transparency considered in the ICSID amendment covers not only privacy and 
documentation but also more immediate issues of third party funding and double-hatting, which 
are currently considered to be regulated by means of soft law and relevant BITs mechanisms. 
I will conclude this paper with a critical analysis on whether a soft law like the IBA Guidelines 
are equipped to address these issues to achieve transparency. 
 
CURRENT TRANSPARENCY PROVISIONS UNDER ICSID ARBITRATION RULES 
AND THE TRANSPARENCY RULES AND THEIR DIFFERENCES 
Current ICSID Arbitration Rules – Parties’ Consent And Tribunal’s Discretion 
 
Prior to Ms Kinnear’s speech delivered in April 2018, ICSID states on its website that the 
amendment seeks expansion of transparency provisions with an interaction between the 
amendment and the Mauritius Convention and the Transparency Rules. It states that open 
hearings, publication of awards and submission of amicus curiae briefs will be sought. 
Currently, these practices are regulated under the ICSID Arbitration Rules and the Arbitration 
(Additional Facility) Rules. For instance, the opening hearing may be possible under ICSID 
Arbitration Rule 32. Rule 48 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules provides publication of excerpts 
of award or publication of awards with parties’ consent.  Similarly, Rule 37 provides a legal 
basis for the submission of amicus curiae briefs in the ICSID investment arbitration. 
 
In terms of access to hearing, though the 2006 ICSID Arbitration Rules amendment provides 
an opportunity for the public to access to an investment arbitration which is generally closed 
to non-parties, three hurdles are in place for the public to overcome before any non-parties can 
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gain access to part or all of the hearing. The three hurdles are consultation with the Secretary-
General, parties’ consent and tribunal’s discretion. Furthermore, it has to be subject to the 
possibility of logistic arrangements. 
 
The closeness of ICSID arbitration is evidenced in the language applied in Rules 32 (1) of the 
ICSID Arbitration Rules and Article 39(1) of the Arbitration (Additional Facility) Rules, where 
the participants of the arbitration proceedings are limited to the tribunal, officers of the 
tribunal,7 parties, parties’ agents, counsels and advocates as well as witnesses and experts who 
are invited by the disputing parties to give testimony.8 Non-parties’ access to the hearings can 
only be granted by the tribunal (1) without parties’ objection and (2) after consultation with the 
Secretary-General.  
 
The phrase used in Rule 32(2) “the Tribunal, after consultation with the Secretary-General” 
does not seem to suggest that the Tribunal must obtain the Secretary-General’s consent before 
exercising its discretion. However, what it suggests is that the tribunal’s discretion does not 
arise until the consultation has taken place. Supposing, the tribunal’s discretion does not rely 
on the consent of the Secretary-General, one question which will be taken up in the later 
discussion on the current amendment is whether the removal of “after consultation with the 
Secretary-General” would be desirable since arguably the phrase does not serve a significant 
purpose in terms of tribunal exercising its discretion provided within both Rules.  
 
                                                 
7 ICSID Arbitration Rules, Rule 32(2) and ICSID Arbitration (Additional Facility) Rules, Article 39(2). 
8 Ibid. 
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However, this interpretation cannot be said for the requirement of parties’ consent before the 
tribunal exercises its discretion. It is essential to point out that the tribunal’s initiative to open 
up hearings to non-parties can be overruled by the disputing parties’ objection. In other words, 
it is clear that a hearing can only be opened up to non-parties following parties’ approval. This 
approval does not have to be indicated jointly, but can be done unilaterally by either party. 
Disputing parties can expressly approve such an access or passively approve it without making 
objections to the discretion. Whatever way the disputing parties take to indicate their approval, 
it is clear that “access to hearing” is an issue led by the parties. The public’s desire to know the 
information related to the disputes or arbitration proceedings does not play any part in this 
matter.  Even with parties’ approval, the public’s access to an oral hearing can be rejected by 
the tribunal on the grounds of the lack of appropriate logistic arrangements. If the tribunal 
decides in favour of public access to hearings, arrangements to protect privileged information 
must be made, despite the fact that no definition of “privilege information” is provided in Rule 
32(2) of both Rules. 
 
Publication of awards is considered by the working paper. The possibility of expanding the 
scope of publication of awards in responding to the call for greater transparency provisions is 
further confirmed in Ms. Kinnear’s speech.   The current ICSID provisions on publication of 
awards are provided in Article 48(4) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules and Article 53(3) of the 
Arbitration (Additional Facility) Rules which is operated on the combination of parties’ 
consent and tribunal’s inherent duty. Under both provisions, the full publication of an award 
can only be made with parties’ consent. The interpretation of this provision is that the parties 
must give the Centre or the Secretariat an express consent to enable the publication of the full 
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award. Any objections from one party would only provide both the Centre and the Secretariat 
a legal duty to publish the excerpts of the legal reasoning of the Tribunal.  
 
The topic of amicus curiae briefs is also under review. The potential transparency provisions 
the amendment may maintain is the opportunity for non-disputing parties to file submissions, 
the so-called “amicus curiae briefs”.9  In terms of this practice, different from the wordings 
used in “access to hearings” and “publication of awards”, though the provisions emphases the 
importance of “[a]fter consulting both parties”, the decision allowing amicus curiae briefs 
seems to lie in the tribunal’s discretion. This can be seen from the differences in the use of 
words of “[u]nless either party objects” provided for access to oral hearing,10 “without the 
consent of the parties” for publication of awards11  and “after consulting both parties” in Rules 
37(2) of the Arbitration Rules and Article 41(3) of the Arbitration (Additional Facility) for 
submission of amicus curiae briefs. For the latter, the language does not suggest any 
consequences of parties’ objection in relation to the tribunal’s discretion.  
 
However, the tribunal’s discretion is subject to some justifications on its part.  The tribunal has 
a duty to demonstrate that the submission made by non-disputing party, who has a significant 
interest in the proceeding,12 is within the scope of the dispute.13 Additionally, the submission 
must also have the value which “would assist the Tribunal in the determination of a factual or 
legal issue related to the proceeding by bringing a perspective, particular knowledge or insight 
                                                 
9 https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Amendment-of-ICSID-Rules-and-Regulations.aspx <accessed on 
23 June 2018> 
10 (n 7) 
11 ICSID Arbitration Rules, Article 48(4) and ICSID Arbitration (Additional Facility) Rules, Article 53(3). 
12 Arbitration Rules, Rule 37(2) (c) and ICSID Arbitration (Additional Facility) Rules, Article 41(3) (c). 
13 Arbitration Rules, Rule 37(2) (b) and ICSID Arbitration (Additional Facility) Rules, Article 41(3) (b). 
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that is different from that of the disputing parties.”14 Furthermore, the tribunal has a duty to 
control the arbitration proceedings in ensuring that the submission of amicus curiae briefs 
“does not disrupt the proceeding or unduly burden or unfairly prejudice either party”.15 Most 
importantly, the tribunal has a duty to delivery due process provisions offering both parties an 
equal opportunity to present their observations on the briefs.  
 
The Transparency Rules – Public Interest To Know 
The ICSID’s cureent approcah on transparency is different from the provisions provided by the 
Mauritius Convention and the Transparency Rules which are highlighted as international 
instruments which emulated the ICSID amendment in 2006. Research16 has shown that the 
transparency provisions provided by these two instruments have already achieved a much 
higher degree of transparency than those provided under the current ICSID Arbitration Rules. 
The transparency provisions provided by the Transparency Rules are based on “public rights 
to know”. This is evident in the design of default position and the removal of parties’ consent 
element. The compulsory nature of the Rules is evident in various provisions of the 
Transparency Rules, such as applicability of the Rules to any investment arbitration subject to 
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules,17 non-derogation of the Rules from disputing parties,18 
establishment of tribunal’s power to conduct arbitration in a manner which is consistent with 
the transparency objectives.19  
                                                 
14 Arbitration Rules, Rule 37(2) (a) and ICSID Arbitration (Additional Facility) Rules, Article 41(3) (a). 
15 Arbitration Rules, Rule 37(2) and ICSID Arbitration (Additional Facility) Rules, Article 41(3). 
16 H. Yu & M.B. Olmos Giupponi ‘The Pandora Box Effects under the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules’ 2016 
(5) Journal of Business Law 347-372 
17 The Transparency Rules, Article 1(1). 
18 The Transparency Rules, Article 1(3)(a).  
19 The Transparency Rules, Article 1(3)(b). 
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Different from current ICSID limited transparency provisions which are based on parties’ 
consent and tribunal’s discretion (subject to certain conditions), the default position of the 
Transparency Rules is the disclosure of information related to the disputes and arising from 
arbitration proceedings. In the case of the tribunal’s discretionary authority which requires the 
tribunal’s consultation with the disputing parties,20 the tribunal must consider “public interest 
in transparency”21 and disputing parties’ interest in a fair and efficient manner. A tribunal is 
also required to conduct arbitration in a manner with the promotion of transparency in mind22 
to the extent that the transparency objectives provided in the Rules always prevail over any 
conduct, measure or other actions having the effect of wholly undermining the objectives.23 
Furthermore, except the mandatory rules,24 the Transparency Rules should prevail in the case 
of conflict of rules.25 
 
Following the overarching objective of transparency, the Rules introduces the transparency 
provision in access to hearing, submission of amicus curiae briefings and publication of 
documentations and awards.26  Apart from the submission of amicus curiae briefings, the 
default position taken in the Transparency Rules is the duty to ensure transparency. For instance, 
in relation to publication of documents, the documentations submitted to arbitration, 
                                                 
20 The Transparency Rules, Article 1(3)(b). 
21 The Transparency Rules, Article 1(4)(a). 
22 The Transparency Rules, Article 1(5). 
23 The Transparency Rules, Article 1(6). 
24 The Transparency Rules, Article 1(8). 
25 The Transparency Rules, Article 1(7). 
26 Maria Nicole Cleis, The Independence and Impartiality of ICSID Arbitrators (Brill, 2017) 89. 
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documentations arising from arbitration and awards is subjected to the duty of transparency.27 
The exception to such a duty is confidential or protected information defined in Article 7 of the 
Transparency Rules. Similarly, in the efforts to ensure procedural transparency, apart from 
public hearing,28 the tribunal has a duty to allow the submission by a non-disputing party to the 
treaty (home state) to provide treaty interpretation. Returning to the issue of amicus curiae 
briefings, though the tribunal’s discretion to allow such submissions can only be initiated “after 
consultation with the disputing parties”,29 the parties’ consent is not required. Furthermore, a 
third person only has to demonstrate its own significant interest in the arbitral proceedings and 
the submission would assist the arbitral tribunal in its determination with the different 
perspective or particular knowledge being brought to the proceedings. This applies to any 
submissions which are made outside the scope of the dispute.30 In the tribunal’s exercise of 
discretion in this matter to adapt the requirements of this Rules, the tribunal must observe the 
overarching transparency objective of the Rules provided in Article 1(3)(b) as well as 
avoidance of the transparency objective being undermined.31 
 
The changes brought in by the Transparency Rules is the recognition of public right to know 
which was undermined by the ICSID “parties’ consent” approach. In investment disputes, due 
to the nature of foreign investment activities, the people who can have a significant interest in 
the projects, the disputes, the conduct of the proceedings and the result of the arbitration are 
not limited to the disputing parties. The stakeholders who may have interest in the dispute 
                                                 
27 The Transparency Rules, Articles 2 and 3(1). 
28 The Transparency Rules, Article 6(1). 
29 The Transparency Rules, Article 4(1). 
30 This condition is prescribed in Rule 37(2)(b) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules and Article 41(3)(b) of the 
Arbitration (Additional Facility) Rules). 
31 The Transparency Rules, Article 1(6). 
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includes the parties, the host state, the home state, the local business communities, and, most 
importantly, the public. Among the big players with financial resources, the general public can 
be the most vulnerable group whose rights can be easily sacrificed due to their lack of resources 
to present the negative impact on their livelihood in front of the tribunal. The lack of access to 
the proceedings will affect their right to know in order to protect their own social and economic 
rights. Standing from the viewpoint of the public’s interest, it is not difficult to understand why 
the Transparency Rules introduces very different provisions from those provided in the ICSID 
Arbitration Rules in terms of publication of arbitration information and access to hearings.  
 
MOST RECENT INDICATIONS GIVEN BY THE ICSID SECRETARY-GENERAL 
IN RELATION TO THE ISSUEOF TRANSPARENCY - PUBLIC CONFIDENCE 
 
While there is no desire for any radical changes on the issue of transparency, the Secretary-
General’s speech expressed a limited dissatisfaction concerning the current provisions over 
privacy. Ms. Kinnear’s concerns over transparency are the links between publication of awards, 
duty of disclosure and “public confidence”. This leads to speculation that there would be no 
changes to the current provisions in Rule 32 (2). The current approach of “parties joint consent” 
could still be the key determining factor in the authorisation of attendance of a third person to 
the hearings. Nevertheless, the amicus curiae practice provided in Rules 37 was raised as an 
urgent issue in the current amendment. Under these circumstances it is very likely that one may 
not see the tribunal being imposed with a procedural duty to consider any amicus curiae 
submission made by a person or entity that is not a part to the dispute.  
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The “delicate issue” in relation to transparency mentioned in Ms. Kinnear’s speech and 
interview is linked to “access to case-related documents / information”. She takes the view that 
the most important aspects related to transparency in documents is “making decision and 
awards public” to increase public confidence.32 The only issue raised in her speech is the 
likelihood of departing from “parties’ consent” approach in relation to the publication of 
awards, orders and decisions to achieve “public confidence” in ICSID arbitration mechanism. 
To achieve public confidence, it is pointed out that the working paper group will suggest a 
mandatory publication of tribunal’s awards, orders and decisions. Through the publications of 
awards, ICSID hopes to achieve a high level of consistency and coherence in the tribunal’s 
decision-making and jurisprudence. This is intended to provide transparency to disputants with 
a clear guidance of the jurisprudence and legal reasoning.  It will also allow the disputants to 
appreciate the operation of arbitration procedures and understand the jurisprudence and 
interpretation of foreign investment law. The words used by the Secretary-General at the 
interview were: ‘[t]he working paper therefore proposes mandatory publication of awards (or 
extracts of awards), decisions and orders.’  
 
Contextualising the point on “public confidence” and transparency within the current ICSID 
provisions and Ms Kinnear’s speech, the author’s speculation is that there will be some changes 
to the current provisions. It is speculated that the current wording “extracts of awards” will not 
make its way into the amendment. This differentiates between the new ICISD amendment and 
the current Rule 48(4) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules, which already imposes mandatory duty 
                                                 
32  Baltag, (n 2) point 6. 
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in 
International Arbitration Law Review . The definitive published version will be available 
online on Westlaw UK or from Thomson Reuters DocDel service. 
 
 
14 
 
of publications of excepts of the legal reasoning of the Tribunal. Possibly, the words 
“mandatory publication of awards, decisions and orders” could be included in the current 
amendment. Following this, Rule 48(4) of the Arbitration Rules would have to be redrafted to 
reflect this change. The new provision may read: “The Centre shall publish the awards, 
decisions and orders of the Tribunal promptly.” The word “shall” corresponds with the 
consideration of “mandatory publication” mentioned in the speech. This change will increase 
the understanding of the jurisprudence of foreign investment arbitration through the publication 
of awards, as well as leave the parties with no doubt to what information is to be released into 
the public domain at the end of arbitration proceedings.  
  
However, in relation to other case-related information, it is the working paper group’s intention 
to have them subject to the relevant treaty obligations and parties’ consent. Because of this, it 
is not expected to see a full disclosure provision as the one stipulated in Article 3 of the 
Transparency Rules to be included in the amendment.33 The adoption of limited transparency 
on the case-related material may have the advantage of not placing the tribunal in a 
goalkeeper’s position in judging who and what should be admitted in proceedings34 to achieve 
the efficiency of arbitration proceedings. Nevertheless, at the same time, the public’s right to 
know what may impact on their interest seems to be omitted.  
 
                                                 
33 The provision covers: ‘the notice of arbitration, the response to the notice of arbitration, the statement of 
claim, the statement of defence and any further written statements or written sub- missions by any disputing 
party; a table listing all exhibits to the aforesaid documents and to expert reports and witness statements, if such 
table has been prepared for the proceedings, but not the exhibits themselves.’ 
34 Yu and Olmos Giupponi (n 16). 
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This limited level of transparency is set to achieve the goals of amendment; modernise the 
ICSID Arbitration Rules, address the practical issue arising from case experience, increase 
effectiveness and due process, maintain a balance of rights and duties between investors and 
member states. However, it is clear that the ICSID amendment seems to exclude the right to 
know of the public who are now viewed as a stakeholder in foreign investment disputes. In 
other words, the confidence of the “public” referred in the Secretary-General’s speech seems 
to point to the “public” who are engaged in ICSID Investment Arbitration. They are: “the 
parties, their agents, counsel and advocates, witnesses and experts during their testimony and 
officers of the Tribunal”35 as the current provision provides. The confidence of “the public” 
refers the confidence of “the users” of the ICISD arbitration.  
 
Supposing, it is “the users” meant in the speech and the interview, the general public would be 
excluded from the arbitration proceedings. This is due to the current transparency provisions 
where the general public could only be viewed as users when the parties and the tribunal allow 
them to become part of the proceedings as examined. Unfortunately, this is an inward-looking 
approach which ensures that the due process and balance of rights related to the “internal 
players” are observed. Such an approach is drastically different from the outward approach 
adopted in the Transparency Rules where “the public” means the general public who has a 
significant interest to the disputes or the result of the disputes. Under the Transparency Rules, 
“the public” can be a local farmer whose livelihood may be lost due to the investment 
activities/disputes between the disputing parties. Alternatively, it can also be an international / 
local NGO which may be able to assist the tribunal ‘in the determination of a factual or legal 
                                                 
35 ICSID Arbitration Rules, Rule 32(2). 
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issue related to the proceedings by bringing a perspective, particular knowledge or insight that 
is different from that of the disputing parties’.36 
 
Sornarajah states that the focus of international investment law has been shifted from the 
protection of single individuals or groups of individuals whose goal was to make quick profits 
to the protection of the process of investment made by multinational corporations. 37 
Nevertheless, the development of foreign investment law is moving to address the rights and 
obligations of all stakeholders who may be impacted upon by the activities carried out by 
multinational corporations, States, State corporations, international institutions, non-
governmental organisations and the general public. 38  This demands the outward looking 
approach taken by the Transparency Rules. Taking as an example, the requirement of “a 
particular public interest” set out in Vivendi,39 in the tribunal’s order responding to a petition 
for transparency and participation in the form of amicus curiae briefs, the tribunal held that the 
result of the disputes arising from the water distribution and sewerage system of the city of 
Buenos Aires and surrounding municipalities would have a wider impact on the public. This 
wider impact on non-parties provides a legitimate “public interest” for involvement of non-
party.  This is especially the case for public-private partnerships projects (PPPs) where both 
private party and government body agree to provide a public asset or service40 by means of a 
                                                 
36 Ibid. 
37 M. Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (3rd edn, CUP 2012) 60.  
38 Ibid, 60-68 
39 Aguas Argentinas SA, Suez Sociedad General de Anguas de Barcelona SA and Vivendi Universal SA v 
Argentine Republic (Order in Response to a Petition for Transparency and participation as amicus curiae) ICSID 
Case No ARB/03/19. 
40 The World Bank, Asian Development Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, ‘Public –Private 
Partnership Reference Guide Version 2.0’ (2014) https://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-
partnership/library/public-private-partnerships-reference-guide-version-20, 14 <accessed on 23 June 2018>; The 
PPPs can be carried out in the areas of tourism, housing projects, school projects or the fundamental 
infrastructures. 
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long-term investment contract. The impact of management, remuneration, performance and 
consequent dispute resolution would have been extended to the “public” who would have a 
significant interest to the dispute as required by ICSID Arbitration Rules.  
 
CONSEQUENCES OF AN INWARD-LOOKING APPROACH IN TRANSPARENCY 
- TRIBUNAL DUTY OF DISCLOSURE AND THE PRACTICE OF DOUBLE 
HATTING 
 
Taking such an inward-looking approach, it may not come as a complete surprise to learn that 
the Secretary-General raised the issue of tribunal’s duty of disclosure under the heading of 
transparency.  In practice, this issue has a significant impact on the due process of investment 
arbitration. The impact does affect not only the direct users of investment arbitration, but also 
the indirect users whose rights may be impacted upon by the result of the dispute. While the 
Transparency Rules are silent on this issue, the Secretary-General specifically raised the 
concerns over double hatting and third party funding in the practice of international investment 
arbitration in her response to transparency. It is understood that an elaborated tribunal’s duty 
of disclosure, declaration, in relation to the parties, to the counsels, to co-arbitrator, to funders, 
calendar and availability will be on the cards. Nevertheless, her talk also gives out the clearest 
indication that the amendment will not seek a hard-line regulatory framework but seeking 
resources providing regulation through soft law and the duty of an early disclosure and 
avoidance of conflicts of interest.41 
 
                                                 
41 2017 The ICSID Rules Amendment Process, 1. 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/about/ICSID%20Rules%20Amendment%20Process-ENG.pdf 
<accessed on 23 June 2018> 
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To have these two matters regulated indirectly, in terms of duty of disclosure, one may have to 
look into the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration42 which are 
referred and considered by most arbitrators in deciding this matter.43 It is claimed that ‘the 
Guidelines have gained wide acceptance within the international arbitration community.’44  
The duty of disclosure under the Guidelines applies to a party who is aware of the relationship 
between the arbitrator and any person or entity with a direct economic interest in, or a duty to 
indemnify a party for, the award to be rendered in the arbitration.45 The Guidelines operate on 
the basis of advance waivers on the issues of disclosure, conflicts of interest, the independence 
and impartiality of arbitral or administrative secretaries and third–party funding. In this part of 
the research, the researcher will argue that a total reliance on the IBA Guidelines in addressing 
transparency and its associated issues, such as third party funding and double hatting, must 
proceed with caution due to its inherent nature and the lack of complete regulatory framework.   
 
No compulsory application of the Guidelines 
It is important to highlight that taking the Guidelines into consideration is not without its own 
problem, even though ‘[t]he Guidelines reflect the understanding of the IBA Arbitration 
Committee as to the best current international practice’. 46  This is because the Guidelines 
document is an opt-in instrument, i.e. the parties have to expressly opt in to incorporate its 
application. Goeler holds the view that the IBA Guidelines is nothing more than a reminder for 
the arbitrators 47  as ‘[t]hese Guidelines are not legal provisions and do not override any 
                                                 
42 Adopted by resolution of the IBA Council on Thursday 23 October 2014. 
43 Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides, Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter, Redfern and Hunter on 
International Arbitration (6th edn, OUP 2015) 5.80 
44 IBA Guidelines 2014, page i. 
45 IBA Guidelines 2014, General Standards (7)(a). 
46 IBA Guidelines 2014, Introduction para 4. 
47 von Goeler, Third Party Funding in International Arbitration and Its Impact on Procedure (Kluwer Law 
International 2016) 253. 
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applicable national law or arbitral rules chosen by the parties.’48 The parties must express their 
wishes to incorporate the Guidelines into their procedural rules in order to have a compulsory 
application.49 This will apply to the amendment if ICISD intends to have this issue dealt with 
by soft law and outside of its hard-line regulatory regime. To ensure the maximised compulsory 
application, the amendment could insert an opt-out provision in its amendment to maximise 
the application of IBA Rules. It may be in the wording of ‘Unless parties express their objection, 
the matters such as third party funding, tribunal’s duty of independence and impartiality as 
such will be regulated by the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International 
Arbitration.’ 
 
The other way to include the Guidelines to supplement the ICSID regulatory framework is to 
encourage to parties to opt in its application by treaty duties or agreement. Although it is 
possible to introduce a new provision signposting the parties to look into the relevant BITs 
provision on this issue, generally speaking, most BITs will not fit for such a purpose. This is 
because most BITs only prescribe the types of dispute resolutions mechanisms, rather than a 
detailed prescription of duty of disclosure or third-party funding. For these two issues, the 
disputing parties will have to resort to the relevant arbitration rules.  Following this approach, 
one would see little difference between the amendment and the system which is currently 
operated under ICSID. Consequently, the joint efforts of the signatory parties to the treaties 
and the disputing parties to include the Guidelines to ensure its application would be essential.  
 
                                                 
48 IBA Guidelines 2014, Introduction para 6. 
49 Anne Richardson Oakes and Haydn Davies, ‘Justice Must Be Seen To Be Done: A Contextual Reappraisal’ 
(2016) 37 Adelaide Law Review 461, 463. 
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Supposing the Guidelines are included into the ICSID regulation framework in the amendment 
through either method mentioned above, they may still not be able to address various situations 
related to the issues of duty of disclosure and third-party funding because, the Guidelines state 
that ‘the lists do not purport to be exhaustive, nor could they be’.50 Consequently, the General 
Principles Regarding Impartiality, Independence and Disclosure in the Guidelines only provide 
a “general guidance”. For instance, every arbitrator51 shall remain impartial and independent 
from the parties during the process of arbitration.52 Any doubts over his or her own ability to 
act independent or impartial should prompt the tribunal to decline to accept the appointment.53 
Unless the parties exercise their advance waiver after the appointment, 54  any facts or 
circumstances which may have affected this issue should be viewed from a reasonable third 
person. A reasonable third person is defined as a person who has knowledge of the relevant 
facts and circumstances ‘would reach the conclusion that there is a likelihood that the arbitrator 
may be influenced by factors other than the merits of the case as presented by the parties in 
reaching his or her decision.’55 Corresponding to the tribunal’s duty, the parties also have a 
duty to inform the arbitrator, the arbitral tribunal, the other parties and the arbitration institution 
or other appointing authority of any direct or indirect relationship between the party and the 
arbitrator. Potential conflicts of interest are deemed to be waived by parties if no forthcoming 
objections are raised within 30 days after the receipt of any disclosure by the arbitrators 
concerned or after a party otherwise learns of facts or circumstances of potential conflicts.56 
                                                 
50 IBA Guidelines 2014, Introduction para 7. 
51 IBA Guidelines 2014, General Standards (5) provides that the Guidelines apply to tribunal chairs, sole 
arbitrators and co-arbitrators and arbitral secretaries and administrative secretaries. The tribunal has a duty to 
ensure that such duty is respected at all stages of the arbitration.  
52 IBA Guidelines 2014, General Standards (1). 
53 IBA Guidelines 2014, General Standards (2)(a). 
54 IBA Guidelines 2014, General Standards (4). 
55 IBA Guidelines 2014, General Standards (2)(c). 
56 IBA Guidelines 2014, General Standards (4)(a). 
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Furthermore, the parties should not have unilateral discretion to waive any grounds listed in 
the Non-Waivable Red List.57 For others, the waiver can only be supported with parties’ 
express agreement 58  and if both parties, co-arbitrators, arbitration institutions or the 
appointment authority have full knowledge of the conflict of interest.59 
 
Paragraph 7 of the General Standards Regarding Impartiality, Independence and Disclosure 
requires the parties to perform a duty to conduct reasonable enquiries and provide any relevant 
information available to them. The level required for performance of such a duty is “reasonable 
effort” in terms of ascertainment and disclosure.60 Similar duty was also imposed upon an 
arbitrator to enquire into his own independence and impartiality. Such a duty is not excused by 
lack of knowledge.61 
 
 
If ICSID prescribes to the Guideline, the arbitrator’s duty to disclose conflicts of interest will 
trigger the enquiries into arbitrator’s competence. The working paper group must stress (1) the 
nature of the non-exclusive lists62 and non-detailed situations constituting conflicts of interest 
in the Guidelines and (2) the preventive and non-presumptive nature of the Guidelines which 
expressly state that ‘[d]isclosure does not imply the existence of a conflict of interest, nor  
should it be itself a result either in a disqualification of the arbitrator, or in a presumption 
regarding disqualification.’63 The disclosure requirement is to afford the parties an opportunity 
                                                 
57 IBA Guidelines 2014, General Standards (2)(d). 
58 IBA Guidelines 2014, General Standards (4)(c)(ii). 
59 IBA Guidelines 2014, General Standards (4)(c)(i). 
60 Explanation to general Standard 7(c), IBA Guidelines 2014, General Standards (7)(c). 
61 IBA Guidelines 2014, General Standards (7)(d). 
62 Non-waivable Red list, Waivable Red list, Orange list and Green list, Practical Application of the General 
Standard of the IBA Guidelines. 
63 para 4 Part II of Practical Application of the General Standard of the IBA Guidelines. 
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to objectively review the appointment of arbitrators from the viewpoint of “a reasonable third 
person” when the relevant facts and circumstances are made available to them. Instead of solely 
relying on the tribunal’s self-determination of the principle of competence/competence 64 
behind a closed door, the inclusion of the IBA Guidelines will provide the parties an 
opportunity to exercise advance waivers to increase the transparency in independence and 
impartiality of the appointed arbitrators. It would potentially reduce the number of challenges 
based on the lack of independence and impartiality. 
 
However, the working paper group should consider whether the position of “nondisclosure 
cannot by itself make an arbitrator practical or lacking independence” adopted in the IBA 
Guidelines is ideal. Currently, the emphasis placed by the IBA Guideline is “the failure to 
disclosure the facts and circumstance” which leads to disqualification as the determining factor. 
However, such an approach would cause delay in the arbitral proceedings where the tribunal 
will have to invest time and energy to deal with such a preliminary issue where a full proof is 
required. To address such an issue, the working paper should consider whether the requirement 
of a full disclosure being made prior to the appointment would make better sense in dealing 
with non-assumption of automatic non-appointment discussed in paragraph five of the Practical 
Application. 
 
Transparency In Third Party Funding 
Third party funding involving a third person who provides financial resource to a direct party 
to international investment dispute has become an international phenomenon65 in international 
                                                 
64 ICSID Convention, Article 41(1) and (2); ICSID Arbitration Rules, Rule 41. 
65 See generally R. Mulheron and P. Cashman, ‘Third-Party Funding of Litigation: A Changing Landscape’ 
(2008) 27 C.J.Q. 312; W. Kirtley and K. Wietzykowski, ‘Should an Arbitral Tribunal Order Security for Costs 
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in 
International Arbitration Law Review . The definitive published version will be available 
online on Westlaw UK or from Thomson Reuters DocDel service. 
 
 
23 
 
investment arbitration. Due to the high legal costs the parties have to be burdened with and the 
attractiveness of high rewards to the funders, funders are keen to provide funds to the litigants 
but remain a wire puller 66  to ensure his investment return. 67  It is indicated that 35% of 
practitioners experienced third party funding in their practice.68 However, the practice is also 
criticised for its lack of transparency and a comprehensive regulatory framework. 69  The 
concerns over third party funding are its lack of disclosure mechanism, unlevel playing field, 
controlling exercised by the funders, privity, distortion of procedural justice and effects of 
provisional awards and final awards. 
 
All of these are due to the fact that the operation of third party funding does not represent the 
actual equilateral triangle relationship between parties and the arbitral tribunal.70 With third 
party funder as the wire puller who may use its financial resources to distort the equilateral 
triangle relationship and procedural justice between the main players of arbitration to maximise 
                                                 
when an Impecunious Claimant is Relying on Third Party Funding?’ (2013) 30(1) J. Int. Arb. 17, 28; M. Scherer 
‘Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration Towards Mandatory Disclosure of Funding Agreements?’ in 
A. Dimolitsa and B. M. Cremades Román (eds), Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration, Dossiers of 
the ICC Institute of World Business Law (Kluwer Law International 2013), 95; A. Goldsmith, M. Scherer and C. 
Fléchet, ‘Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration in Europe: RDAI/IBLJ Roundtable 2012’ (2012) 2 
(Part I) International Business Law Journal / Revue de Droit des Affaires Internationales 207; A. Goldsmith, M. 
Scherer and C. Flechet, ‘Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration in Europe: RDAI/IBLJ Roundtable 
2012’ (2012) 6 (Part II) International Business Law Journal / Revue de Droit des Affaires Internationales 649; 
E. De Brabandere and J. Lepeltak, ‘Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration’ (2012) 27 ICSID Rev. 379; 
A. Goldsmith and L. Melchionda, ‘Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration: Everything You Ever 
Wanted to Know (But Were Afraid to Ask)’ (2012) 1 International Business Law Journal 53. 
66 Such as S & T Oil Equipment and Machinery Ltd. v Romania (S&T Oil v Romania), ICSID Case 
No.ARB/07/13) funded by Juridica; Ron Fuchs v The Republic of Georgia (Fuchs and Kardassopoulos v 
Georgia), (ICSID Case No.ARB/07/15) funded by Allianz Litigation Funding, Oxus Gold plc v Republic of 
Uzbekistan, the State Committee of Uzbekistan for Geology & Mineral Resources, and Navoi Mining & 
Metallurgical Kombinat (Oxus Gold v Uzbekistan) and Rusoro Mining Ltd. v Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
ICSID Case No.ARB(AF)/12/5 (Rusoro v Venezuela) funded by Calunius Capital, Teinver S.A.; Transportes de 
Cercanías S.A. and Autobuses Urbanos del Sur S.A. v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.ARB/09/1 
(Teinver v Argentina) funded by Burford, ATA Construction. 
 
68 V. Sahani, ‘Judging Third Party Litigation in Funding’ (2016) 63(1) UCLA Law Review 1, 41. 
69 F. Blavi, ‘Towards a Uniform Regulation of Third Party Funding in International Arbitration’ (2015) 32 
IALR 143, 143. 
70 Hong-Lin Yu, ‘Can Third Party Funding Deliver Justice in International Commercial Arbitration?’ (2017) 
20(1) International Arbitration Law Review 20, 25-26 
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its financial rewards. Consequently, the delivery and integrity of procedural justice in 
international investment arbitration would be questioned. The relationship between parties and 
their counsels may also be subject to changes with the involvements of third party funders. 
 
It was revealed that 76 per cent of practitioners surveyed supports mandatory disclosure of 
third party funding agreement.71 The disclosure of third party funding agreements will serve 
the purposes of ensuring the integrity of arbitration process and awards, levelling the playing 
field between the parties, avoiding unwitting conflicts of interest on the arbitrators’’ part. The 
lack of parties’ duty to disclose the identities of third party funders to the opposing party and 
the tribunal may lead to possible conflicts of interest on arbitrators who are required to 
continuously declare their independence and impartiality throughout the proceedings.72 Seidel 
stresses that such a disclosure is “pertinent in the early stages.” During the process of 
appointment, arbitrators should also have a “distinct desire” to be notified about the identities 
of the funders. The information will allow them to declare their own independence and 
impartiality in order to avoid a situation where the proceedings are aborted due to a later 
detected conflicts of interest on their part.73After all, ‘[t]he impact could be catastrophic.’74 
 
The upcoming ICSID amendment would be the best opportunity for ICSID to tackle this issue 
and introduce the best practice related to third party funding. Unfortunately, the speech 
indicates that this matter will not be part of the amendment, whereas a support from soft law 
                                                 
71 Queen Mary School of International Arbitration and White & Case, International Arbitration Survey: 
Improvements and Innovations International Arbitration (2015) 52 
72 Sahani (n 68) 41. 
73 Seidel, ‘Third-Party Investing in International Arbitration Claims to Invest or Not to Invest? A Daunting 
Question’ in Dimolitsa and Cremades Román (eds), Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration, Dossiers 
of the ICC Institute of World Business Law, Vol. 10 (2013) 22. 
74 Ibid. 
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in 
International Arbitration Law Review . The definitive published version will be available 
online on Westlaw UK or from Thomson Reuters DocDel service. 
 
 
25 
 
may be sought. While the Transparency Rules are silent on this matter, the only possible source 
of soft law is the IBA Guidelines. If the ICSID amendment wishes to rely on the IBA 
Guidelines to provide a regulatory framework for third party funding, the working paper group 
would need to look into General Standard 6(b) of Part One of the Guidelines. General Standard 
6(b) reads: ‘If one of the parties is a legal entity, any legal or physical person having a 
controlling influence on the legal entity, or a direct economic interest in, or a duty to indemnify 
a party for, the award to be rendered in the arbitration, may be considered to bear the identity 
of such party.’ In identifying “controlling influence” and “direct economic interest”, this 
provision directly addresses the issue of third party funding.  
 
 
One of the issues debated in relation to third party funding in arbitration is whether a funder 
should be treated as a party or a third party. The Explanation to General Standard 6(b) clarifies 
this point. According to the explanation, subject to an individual assessment on the nature of 
relationship, the general position of the Guidelines is that any legal persons and individuals 
who may have “a controlling influence” and “direct economic interest in the award”, such as 
third party funders and insurers, may be considered as equivalent to the principal party. This 
would cover the practice of contributing funds or other material support to the prosecution or 
defence of the dispute.75 However, the working paper group may wish to clarify that the current 
wording in the explanation “the equivalent of the party” actually means “the equivalent of the 
principal party”.  If a funder is viewed as a party, the relevant provisions on the impact of the 
provisional measures contained in Article 47 the ICSID Convention and the ICSID Arbitration 
Rules must be amended to extend their effects to third party funders. Although there is no 
                                                 
75 Explanation to General Standard 6(b), 
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intention to amend the Convention for the reason discussed above, any future amendment 
should consider replacing “the respective rights of either party” with “the respective rights of 
parties”.76 Similarly, Rule 39 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules on Provisional Measures would 
also be required to insert a provision to specify that the third party funder is viewed as a party 
in the context of provisional measures for fairness and a level playing field for all parties in 
arbitration proceedings.  
 
The Issue Of Double Hatting And Transparency Under The ICSID Amendment 
It is clear from Ms Kinnear’s speech that the amendment will not provide a hard-line regulatory 
framework to address the issue of double hatting, where one sees a group of highly influential 
“power brokers” regularly play multiple roles as arbitrators and counsels in investment 
arbitration. This controversial practice is known as “double hatting”.77 It is said that “double 
hatting” exists in international investment arbitration and it is not unusual to see an individual 
representing a party in an arbitration and at the same time, or later, serving as an arbitrator in 
another matter submitted to arbitration.78  
 
                                                 
76 Article 47 of the Convention reads: ‘Except as the parties otherwise agree, the Tribunal may, if it considers 
that the circumstances so require, recommend any provisional measures which should be taken to preserve the 
respective rights of either party.’ 
77 https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1142550/“double-hatting”-under-new-scrutiny <accessed on 23 
June 2018> 
78 Dennis H. Hranitzky and Eduardo Silva Romero, The Double Hatting debate international arbitration – 
Should advocates and arbitrators be in separate bars? (14 June 2010) The New York Law Journal, 
https://www.dechert.com/content/dam/dechert%20files/publication/2010/6/the-double-hat-debate-in-
international-arbitration/070101031Dechert.pdf <accessed on 23 June 2018> 
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Calls for new hard-line regulations prohibiting counsels who represent parties in arbitrations 
from serving as arbitrators in other cases have been made.79 The main concern over double 
hatting in relation to transparency is the potential impact on arbitrator’s impartiality in terms 
of different interpretations of the same issue advocated by them in their capacity of different 
roles.  Such a concern is not unwarranted. In international investment arbitration, one 
frequently sees the parties submit different interpretations of the similar or identical provisions 
in bilateral investment treaties. These issues are raised by parties, argued by counsels and 
decided by a small pool of arbitrators repeatedly. It is pointed out that this small pool of 
arbitrators who are experienced in arbitrating investment disputes has also taken or will later 
take a position as counsels in other cases. 80 Consequently, conflicts arise where, wearing an 
advocate’s hat, the counsel cites an award delivered by himself in the capacity as an arbitrator, 
or vice versa. The seriousness of this issue is further clouded by the concerns over whether ‘an 
arbitrator acting as legal counsel is coloured by their arbitral role or uses his or her pleadings 
in one case for the purpose of being picked up and used by the same individual in their work 
as an arbitrator in another.’81 Linking such practice with the public concerns over investment 
disputes, Hranitzky and Romero succinctly put:  
Fears that such scenarios (or others like them) could raise questions about the 
arbitrator’s impartiality, or at least the appearance of impartiality in the eyes of an 
objective observer, are exacerbated by the fact that investment disputes commonly raise 
                                                 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid; Philippe Sands, ‘Developments in Geopolitics: The End(s) of Judicialization?’ Closing speech at 
European Society of International Law Conference, 12 September 2015; Reprinted in EJIL Talk!, 12 October 
2015 ; https://www.ejiltalk.org/2015-esil-annual-conference-final-lecture-developments-in-geopolitics-the-ends-
of-judicialization/; Reflections on International Judicialization, European Journal of International Law (2016) 
27(4) 885-900, 894 <accessed on 23 June 2018> 
81 Malcolm Langford, Daniel Behn and Runar Hilleren Lie, The Ethics and Empirics of Double Hatting, (2017) 
6(7) ESIL Reflections1, 8. 
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issues of public concern, and the fact that, in contrast to most commercial arbitration, 
the awards in investment arbitrations are available to the public.82 
 
The figure for double hatting practice was said to be 47% among “small, tightly knit, network 
power” 83 of arbitrators who is also called “power brothers”84 in a total of 391 investment 
arbitrations. This figure is three times that of double hatting in 118 counsel only cases which 
took 11% of overall practice. These two figures occupy a majority of the cases surveyed. 
Excessive fees are said to be charged to the disputants to investment arbitrations. Investment 
arbitration has become a business as ‘[t]he investment arbitrator of today resembles nothing of 
the traditional and genteel picture of the moonlighting arbitrator in the occasional dispute.’85 
This persistent practice of double hatting saw the arbitrator being challenged in Telekom 
Malaysia v Ghana (Telekom Malaysia) 86  and later resigned from the role of counsel in 
Consortium RFCC v Morocco87 following the ruling made by the District Court of the Hague. 
Acting as the legal counsel for Consortium RFCC, Gaillard sought annulment of the award 
favouring Morocco88 which was relied upon by Ghana in Telekom Malaysia.89 Similarly being 
challenged, though unsuccessful, Judge Stephen Schwebel’s impartiality and his role as the 
                                                 
82 Hranitzky and Romero (n 78). 
83 Tori Loven Kirikebø, ‘Lawyers in Problematic Dual Role As Arbitrators’ (5 September 2017 )Science Nordic, 
http://sciencenordic.com/lawyers-problematic-dual-role-arbitrators <accessed on 23 June 2018> 
84 Ibid. 
85 Langford et al. (n 81) 7. 
86  Professor Emmanuel Gaillard was challenged in Telekom Malaysia Berhad v The Republic of Ghana, PCA 
Case No 2003-03 UNCITRAL Settled. 
87 Consortium R.F.C.C. v Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/6, Decision on Annulment (18 
January 2006); After his resignation from the role of counsel in Consortium RFCC, the challenge was overruled 
and he was entrusted with open-mindness in his defence in the legal points.  
88 Ibid. 
89 District Court of the Hague, Challenge No. 13/2004, HA/RK 2004.667, Decision of October 18, 2004, 
reprinted in ASA Bulletin (Kluwer Law International (2005) 25(1) 186, 192 
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arbitrator in Eureko v Poland 90  were also questioned by Argentina in Vivendi v 
Argentina91about his role as the counsel for Vivendi. 
 
Warning has been made about double hatting which is protected due to the lack of transparency 
within the investment arbitration system. It is said to significantly impact the integrity of the 
system.92 The perception of  the so-called “clubbiness” in allowing judge or arbitrator to appear 
as counsel before their fellow judges or arbitrators is said to ‘create ... a perception ... that the 
presiding judge [or arbitrator] would or could not be impartial if a fellow judge [or arbitrator] 
is acting as counsel for the opposing party.’93 Hence, separate bars for arbitrators and counsels 
has been advocated to ‘improve arbitrator’s perceived capacity to adjudicate with an open 
mind.’94 While questions over whether practitioners can be forced to choose between the roles 
of arbitrators and counsels may be raised, on the balance of the integrity of investment 
arbitration, one has to enquire into whether such a practice with ethical concerns95 would cause 
                                                 
90 Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija, S.A. & Compagnie Générale des Eaux, v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/97/3, Award, https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0206.pdf <accessed 
on 23 June 2018> 
91 Ibid. 
92 Sands, ‘Conflict of Interest for Arbitrators and /or Counsel’ in M Kinnear et al (eds) Building International 
Investment Law: The First 50 Years of ICSID (2015) 655, Maria Nicole Cleis, The Independence and 
Impartiality of ICSID Arbitrators (Brill, 2017) 104. 
93 Georgia Judicial Qualifications Commission, Opinion No. 200 (April 26, 1995); Hranitzky and Eduardo Silva 
Romero (n 78); This was discussed in the context of Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) and American Bar 
Association (ABA). Section 11 of CAS Statutes of the Bodies Working for the Settlement of Sports-Related 
Disputes 2017 reads: “A member of ICAS or the Board may be challenged when circumstances allow legitimate 
doubt to be cast on her/his independence vis-à-vis a party to an arbitration which must be the subject of a decision 
by ICAS or the Board pursuant to Article S6, paragraph 4. She/he shall pre-emptively disqualify herself/himself 
when the subject of a decision is an arbitration procedure in which a sports-related body to which she/he belongs 
appears as a party or in which a member of the law firm to which she/he belongs is an arbitrator or counsel.” Rule 
3.10 of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct 2011, “A judge shall not practice law. A judge may act pro se 
and may, without compensation, give legal advice to and draft or review documents for a member of the judge’s 
family, but is prohibited from serving as the family member’s lawyer in any forum.” 
94 Anthony Sinclair and Matthew Gearing, ‘Partiality and Issue Conflicts,’ (2010) 5(4) Transnational Dispute 
Management 14, https://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=1284 <accessed on 23 
June 2018> 
95 Similar concerns are also expressed in Malcolm Langford et al. (n 81) 1. 
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“legitimacy crisis of international investment law.”96 In particular, one has seen an arbitrator 
give out rulings in favour his own arguments put forward as a legal counsel in another 
proceeding. It is especially alarming that the jurisprudence of foreign investment law is allowed 
to be developed in such a fashion, potentially without objective interpretation of legal points. 
A strong feeling was expressed by Fernández-Armesto who states: ‘if this requires that the 
roles of arbitrators and lawyers be separated, then let’s assume it as a necessary cost for the 
survival of investment arbitration.’97  
 
Judge Buergenthal98 expresses concerns over ICSID’s vulnerability to the practice of double 
hatting due to its remits in interpreting similar treaty duties on a regular basis. The strong view 
invoked by him requires arbitrators and counsel ‘to decide to be one or the other, and be held 
to the choice they have made, at least for a specific period of time.’ He vividly puts:  
I also believe that repeated designations by counsel of the same arbitrator should be 
avoided. These revolving-door problems —counsel selecting an arbitrator who, the next 
time around when the arbitrator is counsel, selects the previous counsel as arbitrator — 
                                                 
96 Kirikebø (n 83). 
97 Juan Fernández-Armesto, IBA Arbitration Day 2012 Stockholm, Counsel and Arbitrator in Investment 
Arbitration: Does The Mixing of The Rule Nix Neutrality, 6 http://jfarmesto.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/Counsel-and-Arbitrator-in-Investment-Arbitration-Does-the-mixing-of-the-roles-nix-
neutrality.pdf <accessed on 23 June 2018> 
98 Thomas Buergenthal, ‘The Proliferation of Disputes, Dispute Settlement Procedures and Respect for the Rule 
of Law’ (2006) 22(4) Arbitration International 495, 498. He states: “I have long believed that the practice of 
allowing arbitrators to serve as counsel, and counsel to serve as arbitrators, raises due process of law issues. In 
my view, arbitrators and counsel should be required to decide to be one or the other, and be held to the choice 
they have made, at least for a specific period of time. That is necessary, in my opinion, in order to ensure that an 
arbitrator will not be tempted, consciously or unconsciously, to seek to obtain a result in an arbitral decision that 
might advance the interests of a client in a case he or she is handling as counsel. ICSID is particularly vulnerable 
to this problem because the interpretation and application of the same or similar legal instruments (the bilateral 
investment treaties, for example) are regularly at issue in different cases before it.” 
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should be avoided. Manus manum lavat, in other words 'you scratch my back and I'll 
scratch yours', does not advance the rule of law.99 
 
Judge Buergenthal’s concerns are not being listened to. One sees the arbitrator panels are 
moving away from manifest apparent bias in Article 57 of the ICSID Convention to a more ‘a 
fair minded and informed observer would have reasonable apprehension that the arbitrators are 
biased’ expressed by Lord Hewart in his dictum.100 Unfortunately, Ms Kinnear is clear that the 
working paper will rely on soft law and will not directly address this issue in the upcoming 
amendment. If it is the IBA Guidelines the working paper wishes to rely on to provide guidance 
on this issue, one may have to ask whether IBA Guidelines indicates an appearance or 
perception of bias or conflict or justifiable doubts of a reasonable third person, or even real 
danger of bias. The IBA Guidelines characterizes doubts as ‘justifiable if a reasonable and 
informed third party would reach the conclusion that there was a likelihood that the arbitrator 
may be influenced by factors other than the merits of the case presented by the parties in 
reaching his or her decision.’101  Under the umbrella of “justifiable doubts”, one sees an 
arbitrator or his or her firm regularly advising the party or an affiliate of the party, and deriving 
significant income from the party are placed under the Non-Waivable Red List.102 This  is even 
with arbitrator’s declaration on his independence or impartiality. Compared to giving advice, 
acting as a counsel is far a more serious relationship with the party, hence the double hatting 
                                                 
99 Ibid. 498. 
100 Lord Hewart CJ, R v Sussex Justices; Ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256, 259 (‘R v Sussex Justices’) , Also 
see Richardson and Davies (n 49) 461. 
101 The IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, Part I Article 2. 
102 IBA Guidelines, 1.4 of Non-Waivable Red List. 
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should fall into the Non-Waivable Red List. In the case where the arbitrator has given legal 
advice or103 currently represents one of the parties,104 it is placed under Waivable Red List.  
 
Perhaps, the most direct provision applying to double hatting under the IBA Guidelines is 
paragraph 3.1 of Orange List on arbitrator’s previous services for one of the parties or other 
involvement in the case. Under paragraph 3.1, within the past three years, an arbitrator is 
advised to declare conflicts of interest if he has acted as counsel for105 or against106 one of the 
parties or affiliate of one of the parties in an unrelated matter, has advised or been consulted by 
one the parties,107 has been appointed as an arbitrator by one of the parties on two or more 
occasions by one of the parties, or an affiliate of one of the parties,108 or has been appointed or 
currently serving as an arbitrator by one of the parties on a related matter.109 The period of three 
years is clearly intended to eliminate the so-called revolving door practice criticised in Judge 
Buergenthal’s article110 and decrease the chance of the appearance of bias. Currently, ICSID 
sees repeated appointments of arbitrators who also work in the capacity of counsels. Paragraph 
3.1 may provide an opportunity to reduce double hatting on appointments if both parties and 
arbitrators are required to declare such a conflict. Nevertheless, unfortunately, it has limited 
effects on an appointed arbitrator citing the legal arguments put forwarded by himself in the 
role as a counsel in another case. After all, arbitrators’ previously expressed legal opinions 
                                                 
103 IBA Guidelines, 2.1.1 Waivable Red List. 
104 IBA Guidelines, 2.3.1 Non-Waivable Red List. 
105 IBA Guidelines, 3.1.1 Orange List. 
106 IBA Guidelines, 3.1.2 Orange List. 
107 IBA Guidelines, 3.1.1, Orange List. 
108 IBA Guidelines, 3.1.3 Orange List. 
109 IBA Guidelines, 3.1.5 Orange List. 
110 Buergenthal (n 98) 498. The period of three years also applies to the arbitrator’s law firm, see The IBA 
Guidelines, 3.1.4. 
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concerning similar or same issue are listed under the Green List. Being placed under the Green 
List means that there is not a need for the arbitrator to declare this factor which may concern 
the parties.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Langford stated that the perception of bias or conflict alone should be enough for a 
reconsideration of such a practice.111 The issue is whether such practice should be regulated 
through self-regulation or institution reform. In the process of the ICSID amendment, Ms. 
Kinnear’s speech clearly indicates that publication of full awards, decisions and orders made 
by arbitrators will be recommended in the working paper to promote public confidence in the 
ICSID arbitration mechanism through transparency. It is hoped to resolve the discord and 
strengthen the rule of law through the amendment by removing arbitrariness from tribunal’s 
decision making. However, the debates and current development on transparency should have 
gone beyond publication of awards, decisions and orders. The public’s right to know sees the 
release of information used in arbitration and public participation under the Transparency Rules. 
As demonstrated in this article, Ms. Kinnear’s public confidence is very different from the 
public’s right to know. Whether the transparency measures to be recommended in the working 
paper and the use of soft law will successfully deliver public confidence remains to be seen. 
Ms. Kinnear’s speech interestingly highlights that transparency is also linked to conflicts of 
interest, third party funding and double hatting. This is beyond the scope identified in the 
                                                 
111 Langford et al. (n 81) 7; Judith Levine, ‘Dealing with Arbitrator “Issue Conflicts” in International 
Arbitration’ 61 Disp. Res. J. 60 (2006); Joseph Brubaker, ‘The Judge Who Knew Too Much: Issue Conflicts in 
International Adjudication’ (2008) 26(1) Berkeley J. Int’l Law 111. 
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Transparency Rules. While the amendment will not tackle third party funding and double 
hatting through a hard-line regulatory framework, ICSID must ensure transparency addressed 
in the amendment is what is required in international investment arbitration and by the public. 
It must carefully consider whether IBA Guidelines serve as the best starting point or practice 
for regulating these issues in its delivery of a mechanism with integrity and legitimacy where 
both the public and the users can see that justice is being done.  
 
